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Rising to the Level of Climate Science:
Rhode Island, the National Flood
Insurance Program, and Sea Level
Rise Projections
Nicole E. Rohr, PhD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Rhode Island is the smallest state in the United States, but,
with over one thousand people per square mile, it has the second
highest population density.1 Homes, businesses, tourism centers,
and industrial hubs are primarily located along Rhode Island’s
over-four hundred miles of coastline, providing breath-taking
views, easily accessible beaches, and convenient access to shipping
channels; all of these vital economic sectors lie, at least in part,
within flood-prone lands.2 These low-lying areas, especially the
coastal areas at an elevation less than 4.9 feet above sea level, are
vulnerable to severe coastal storms and coastal flooding.3 Homes
* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law. Nicole Rohr
earned her PhD in Biological Sciences from the University of Rhode Island in
2012.
1.
U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population Data: Population Density,
U.S. CENSUS 2010, https://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionmentdens-text.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). Rhode Island has the fourth highest
population density when U.S. territories are included with the states. Id.
2.
HELEN MANNING, MICHELLE CARNEVALE & PAMELA RUBINOFF, RHODE
ISLAND COASTAL PROPERTY GUIDE 2 (2014), http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Rhode-Island-Coastal-Property-Guide-2014.pdf.
3.
See R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, NATURAL HAZARDS:
HURRICANES, FLOODS, AND SEA LEVEL RISE IN THE METRO BAY REGION SPECIAL
AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN 14 (2009), http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives
/regdocs/released/pdf/CRMC/5766.pdf. (“[The] 4.9-foot contour roughly
represents the area that would be inundated during spring high water with a
2.3-foot rise in sea level. It appears very probable that such a rise will occur
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and businesses in these areas must protect themselves from
damages related to flooding, and primarily have one insurance
option available: coverage through the federal government’s
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).4
The NFIP is administered through the Department of
Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA).5 Established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968,
the NFIP was created to offer flood insurance to properties with
significant flood risk and to reduce the risk of future flooding by
incentivizing floodplain management strategies.6 The NFIP is
structured similarly to other risk-based insurance options (e.g., fire
insurance, vehicle insurance, etc.) with one key difference:
Congress has directed FEMA to heavily subsidize the program for
structures that existed before the NFIP was implemented.7 This is
because risk-based premiums are cost-prohibitive to most property
owners in the floodplain.8 This has resulted in the subsidization of
over twenty percent of NFIP policies, with an average premium rate
of forty to forty-five percent of the actuarial risk-based cost;
however, most of these subsidized policies are in the areas most
prone to flooding, resulting in low-premium and high-loss claims
that have plunged the program into a $23 billion debt to the United
States Treasury.9 As a result of Superstorm Sandy, there was
nearly $40 million in claims paid out in Rhode Island;10 that
within the next 120 years.”).
4.
See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–
4131(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327); see generally JARED T. BROWN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44593, INTRODUCTION TO FEMA’S NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) (2016).
5. § 4004 (Westlaw).
6. Id. § 4001 (Westlaw); BROWN, supra note 4, at 1–2.
7. Reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance Program, Part II:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Hearing]
(statement of Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director Financial Markets
and Community Investment, Government Accountability Office).
8. Id.
9. Id.; BROWN, supra note 4, at 24.
10. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Federal Support for
Rhode Island Sandy Recovery Exceeds $39.4 Million (June 11, 2013),
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/06/11/federal-support-rhode-islandsandy-recovery-exceeds-394-million [hereinafter Press Release, Fed.
Emergency Mgmt. Agency R.I. Fed. Support]. Sandy formed on October 22,
2012, in the Atlantic Ocean and moved along Haiti, the Caribbean Islands, and
the eastern seaboard of the United States before dissipating on October 31,
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amount is a small portion of the over $8.1 billion paid out by the
NFIP to all states affected by Sandy, including the two hardest hit
states, New York and New Jersey.11
This complex interaction between high-risk flood zones and
high-loss claims will be exacerbated in the coming decades by
climate change.12 For instance, rising air temperatures lead to
warming sea surface temperatures, which, in turn, result in sea
level rise and increased frequency of strong coastal storms.13 Over
the last fifty years, sea levels in the northeast have been increasing
three to four times faster than the global average, and Rhode Island
is preparing for an increase of nine feet above 1990 sea levels by
2100.14 In addition to this higher base sea level, climate change
will lead to stronger coastal storms with higher associated storm
2012. See Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com
/2013/07/13/world/americas/hurricane-sandy-fast-facts/ (last updated Nov. 2,
2016). During this time, it peaked in strength as a category two hurricane over
Haiti then fluctuated between a category one hurricane and a post-tropical
cyclone as it moved north, ultimately being referred to as Superstorm Sandy
in New England as it weakened from a hurricane before making landfall in
New Jersey. See id.
11.
The Flood Insurance Claims Process in Communities After Sandy:
Lessons Learned and Potential Improvements: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Housing, Transportation, & Community Development of the S. Comm. on
Banking Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 33 (2014) (statement of Craig
Fugate, Admin., Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of
Homeland Security), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91460
/pdf/CHRG-113shrg91460.pdf.
12.
See Ernest B. Abbott, Flood Insurance and Climate Change: Rising
Sea Levels Challenge the NFIP, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10, 19–20 (2014);
AECOM, MICHAEL BAKER JR., INC. & DELOITTE CONSULTING, LLP, THE IMPACT
OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM THROUGH 2100, at
5-1
to
-28
(2013),
http://www.acclimatise.uk.com/login/uploaded/resources/FEMA_NFIP_report.
pdf.
13. John A. Church et al., Sea Level Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
1137, 1150 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013), http://www.climatechange
2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf; P.J. Webster et al.,
Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming
Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844, 1845 (2005), http://science.sciencemag.
org/content/sci/309/5742/1844.full.pdf.
14.
See WILLIAM V. SWEET ET AL., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE
SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1, 9 (2017), https://tidesandcurrents.
noaa.gov/publications/techrpt83_Global_and_Regional_SLR_Scenarios_for_th
e_US_final.pdf; Tim Faulkner, Ocean State Sea Level-Rise Estimate Now Above
9 Feet, ECORI NEWS (Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.ecori.org/climatechange/2017/2/12/sea-level-rise-estimate-now-above-9-feet.
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surge battering properties from the seaward side and more rainfall
flowing into properties from the landward side.15 All of these
factors combined paint a bleak future for the NFIP unless changes
are made to fortify the program and better characterize future flood
risk.
One of the major concerns in low-lying coastal areas is that the
NFIP flood insurance risk maps (FIRMs) are based on historical
flooding data and do not take into account sea level rise forecasts
from climate-change modeling.16 Rhode Island has been on the
forefront of advocating for the consideration of sea level rise
projections into the NFIP maps and policies, but, thus far, FEMA
has taken only rudimentary steps to address this suggestion.17
Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC)
has spearheaded a large effort to create maps and tools to visualize
future flooding risk under different sea level rise scenarios, and
remains concerned that not taking these threats seriously could
result in liability lawsuits against the state and federal
governments;18 however, options available to Rhode Island to spur
federal change are limited.
This Comment explores the complex problem of insuring Rhode
Island coastal property in a changing environment. First, it
discusses climate change issues that will impact the Rhode Island
coast in the coming century, including the resultant threats to
coastal populations and infrastructure. Second, it provides an
overview of the NFIP, including the creation of FIRMs, recent
efforts by Congress to reform the NFIP, and the ineffectiveness of
the current 2012 FEMA flood maps for Rhode Island. This
Comment also explores suggested flood maps generated by CRMC,
innovative ways those maps can be used, including STORMTOOLS,

15.
See LEANNA HEFFNER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE & RHODE ISLAND’S
COASTS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 6 (2012), http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/climate_summary.pdf.
16.
See TECHNICAL MAPPING ADVISORY COUNCIL, FUTURE CONDITIONS RISK
ASSESSMENT AND MODELING 1 (2015) [hereinafter TMAC REPORT],
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1454954261186-c348aa9b1768298c
9eb66f84366f836e/TMAC_2015_Future_Conditions_Risk_Assessment_and_M
odeling_Report.pdf.
17.
See, e.g., id. at 1–27 (providing recommendations to counsel FEMA
regarding implementation of sea level rise projections into mapping).
18.
See RI Shoreline Change Special Area Management Plan:
STORMTOOLS, BEACH SAMP [hereinafter STORMTOOLS], http://www.
beachsamp.org/stormtools/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2017).
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and explains how property owners currently can challenge the
validity of FEMA flood maps. Third, this Comment analyzes
whether Rhode Island can legally challenge the 2012 FEMA maps
based on the argument that the maps do not consider sea level rise
projections and, if the 2012 FEMA maps are not updated per Rhode
Island’s request, the government could be liable for future flood
damage resulting from climate change. Fourth, this Comment
briefly touches upon ways that Rhode Island could be held liable for
permitting decisions based on FIRMs that the state knows are—
and openly touts as—inaccurate. Finally, this Comment will
conclude that the current legal options available to Rhode Island
are limited, but FEMA has taken actions that indicate it is
considering how best to maintain the solvency of the NFIP and how
to incorporate growing concerns related to sea level rise.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Climate Change Impacts in Rhode Island
The verdict is in on climate change: climate change is real, it
is occurring at rates that exceed projections, and it is exacerbated
by human actions.19 Greenhouse gases released from the burning
of fossil fuels trap heat in our atmosphere, resulting in increasing
air temperatures.
Global atmospheric temperatures have
increased by over 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit since the pre-Industrial
era, with each of the last three decades being successively warmer
than the last.20 This increase in air temperature, in turn, has
resulted in an increase of nearly 0.8 degrees Fahrenheit in global
sea surface temperatures.21 Air temperatures in New England are
expected to increase an additional three to six degrees Fahrenheit
by 2080,22 with associated sea surface temperature increases that
19. See e.g., Naomi Oreskes, The verdict is in on climate change: When it
comes to climate change, open-mindedness is the wrong approach, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/22/opinion/la-oe-oreskesjudging-climate-change-20120122.
20. See RAJENDRA K. PACHAURI ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS
REPORT: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
40 (Keigo Akimoto et al. eds., 2015), http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/
ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf.
21. Id. This temperature increase was measured in the upper 250 feet.
Id.
22. Radley Horton et al., Northeast, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 374 (Jerry M.
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will most strongly impact the Northern Hemisphere.23 Warmer sea
surface temperatures then impact Rhode Island in two ways: (1)
warmer waters expand in a process called thermal expansion,
contributing to sea level rise;24 and (2) warmer waters serve as fuel
for coastal storms, increasing the intensity of tropical storms and
hurricanes.25
The global sea level has increased by an average rate of 0.7
inches per year in the twentieth century, and, since 1930, Rhode
Island has experienced an average sea level rise increase of 0.1
inches per year with a six-inch rise since 1970.26 The northeast—
including Rhode Island—has experienced sea level rise rates three
to four times higher than the global average;27 levels are projected
to increase by over nine feet by 2100.28
The relationship between warmer sea surface temperatures
and tropical storms is more complex than the relationship between
warmer sea surface temperatures and sea level rise, but projections
have shown that hurricane wind speeds increase by about five
percent per every 3.15 degree Fahrenheit increase in sea surface
temperatures, resulting in increased storm surge on top of an
already rising sea level29 and up to twenty percent more rainfall
Melillo et al. eds., 2014). This assumes that greenhouse gas emissions are
substantially reduced; if greenhouse gas emissions are not reduced, then there
could be an increase of over 4.5 to ten degrees Fahrenheit. Id.
23. See PACHAURI ET AL., supra note 20, at 60.
24. See, e.g., Church et al., supra note 13, at 1150–51. Sea level rise is
also impacted by the melting of land-based ice sheets and local magnitude of
isostatic rebound, which are beyond the scope of this article. See id. at 1151–
55.
25. See Webster et al., supra note 13, at 1845–46.
26. See HEFFNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 7; SEA LEVEL RISE IN RHODE
ISLAND: TRENDS AND IMPACTS 2 (2013), http://www.beachsamp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/climate_SLR_factsheet2013.pdf.
27. See Asbury H. Sallenger, Jr. et al., Hotspot of Accelerated Sea-Level
Rise on the Atlantic Coast of North America, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1
(2012),
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v2/n12/full/nclimate1597.
html.
28. See SWEET ET AL., supra note 14, at 23; Faulkner, supra note 14.
29. Thomas R. Knutson & Robert E. Tuleya, Tropical Cyclones and
Climate Change: Revisiting Recent Studies at GFDL, in CLIMATE EXTREMES
AND SOCIETY 120, 121 (H. F. Diaz & R. J. Murnane eds., 2008) [hereinafter
Tropical Cyclones]; see generally Thomas R. Knutson & Robert E. Tuleya,
Impact of CO2-Induced Warming on Simulated Hurricane Intensity and
Precipitation: Sensitivity to the Choice of Climate Model and Convective
Parameterization, 17 (No. 18) J. OF CLIMATE 3477 (2004) [hereinafter Impact of
CO2-Induced Warming].
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within sixty miles of the storm center.30
All of these factors combine to threaten more Rhode Island
infrastructure with more frequent flooding, more intense coastal
storms, and heavier precipitation events. This will cause more
damage to structures currently in the NFIP flood zone, and will
threaten properties with flooding that have historically been
beyond the reach of the encroaching waters.
B. The National Flood Insurance Program
Recognizing the need for flood insurance and the private
insurance market’s inability to provide coverage, Congress enacted
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA).31 This Act
authorizes FEMA to offer primary flood insurance to properties
with significant flood risk, and to incentivize community action to
reduce flood risk through adoption of floodplain management
standards.32 Communities that wish to participate in the NFIP
must voluntarily take action to establish and work toward
floodplain management standards.33 At the time of the enactment
of this Act and continuing through today, it is not economical for
private insurance companies to provide flood insurance to the wide
range of individuals in need of protection on affordable terms and
conditions.34 Congress agreed that the federal government would
provide flood insurance to those in high-risk areas, and private
insurance companies would direct the sale and management of the
policies.35 Currently, all thirty-nine municipalities and one Tribal
Nation in Rhode Island participate in the NFIP.36
FEMA implements a Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning
(MAP) process, which facilitates Flood Insurance Studies (FIS) to
produce FIRMs.37 One category in the FIRMs is Special Flood

30.
31.

Tropical Cyclones, supra note 29, at 120, 131.
42 U.S.C.A. § 4001(b)–(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327);
BROWN, supra note 4, at 1.
32. See § 4001(d) (Westlaw).
33. See id. § 4001(e) (Westlaw).
34. Id. § 4001(b)(1) (Westlaw); BROWN, supra note 4, at 1.
35. See BROWN, supra note 4, at 11–12.
36. Michelle Burnett, Assistant Chief of Planning, R.I. Emergency Mgmt.
Agency, Presentation at the Rhode Island League of Cities and Towns
Convention: National Flood Insurance Program; What Changes Are
Happening in Rhode Island? 5 (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.rileague.org/
DocumentCenter/View/158.
37. See id. at 6, 8.

2017]

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM

513

Hazard Areas (SFHAs), which indicate that an area is exposed to
at least a one-in-one-hundred year risk of annual flooding.38 Within
these SFHAs, property owners are required to purchase flood
insurance as a condition of receiving a federally-backed mortgage,39
and it has been estimated that at least seventy-seven percent of all
mortgages in the SFHA are subject to the requirement to have flood
insurance, whether it is through the NFIP or another provider.40
In Rhode Island, there are approximately 16,000 structures in the
SFHA, and about 9,600 of those have flood insurance covering over
$3.8 billion in property; there are over 16,000 flood insurance
policies statewide, both in and out of the SFHA.41
Congress intended for the NFIP to be actuarial-based, but it
recognized that was not feasible given the challenges of
implementing a new program on already existing structures in the
38. See id. at 4. A one-in-one-hundred year risk of flooding means that
each year there is a one percent chance of the property flooding, and flooding
in a specific year does not impact the independent chance of flooding in
subsequent years. Robert R. Holmes, Jr., The 100-Year Flood—It’s All About
Chance, USGS, https://water.usgs.gov/edu/100yearflood-basic.html (last
updated Dec. 9, 2016).
39. Burnett, supra note 36, at 9. Lenders that provide federally-backed
mortgages includes federal agency lenders, such as the Department of
Veterans’ Affairs, Federal National Mortgage Associate and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, respectively), and
federally insured lending institutions, such as all banks covered by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See Home Loans, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/index.asp (last visited Mar. 17,
2017); Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/FannieMaeandFreddie
Mac/
Pages/About-Fannie-Mae-Freddie-Mac.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2017); Bank
Data
&
Statistics,
FED.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.,
https://www.
fdic.gov/bank/statistical/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
40. RICHARD J. TOBIN & CORINNE CALFEE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MANDATORY PURCHASE REQUIREMENT: POLICIES,
PROCESSES, AND STAKEHOLDERS 31 (2005), https://www.fema.gov/medialibrary-data/20130726-1602-20490-9257/nfip_eval_mandatory_purchase_
requirement.pdf.
41. R.I. COMM’N TO STUDY ECON. RISK DUE TO FLOODING & SEA RISE,
SPECIAL HOUSE COMMISSION TO STUDY ECONOMIC RISK DUE TO FLOODING AND
SEA LEVEL RISE: FINAL REPORT 6 (2016), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/
commissions/fsrcomm/commdocs/20160512%20Economic%20Risk%20Due%20
to%20Flooding%20and%20Sea%20Level%20Rise%20-%20final.pdf; Burnett,
supra note 36, at 5. Structures in the SFHA may not have flood insurance for
a number of reasons including, but not limited to, not having a federallybacked mortgage either through obtaining private financing or having paid off
the mortgage. Id. at 4. Structures outside of the SFHA can voluntarily
purchase private flood insurance. Id.
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newly designated SFHA. To that end, Congress directed FEMA not
to charge actuarial-based rates for properties constructed before
December 31, 1974, or before the date that FEMA published the
first FIRM for the community, whichever came later.42 Given that
government-provided flood insurance is not actuarial-based, the
NFIP is funded through a combination of premiums on flood
insurance policies, annual appropriations from Congress, and by
borrowing from the United States Treasury when the NFIP has
insufficient funds to cover losses.43 High rates of subsidy combined
with recent natural disasters that resulted in catastrophic losses
(i.e., Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Gulf Coast and
Superstorm Sandy in the Northeast) have led to a $23 billion debt
to the United States Treasury, which is perilously close to the
$30.425 billion borrowing cap set by Congress.44 FEMA reported to
Congress that “it likely will not generate sufficient revenues to
repay the billions of dollars borrowed from the [Treasury]” to cover
NFIP claims from recent major storms including Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita in 2005, and Superstorm Sandy in 2012, or
“potential claims related to future catastrophic losses.”45 FEMA
also states that this inability to repay NFIP debt stems from the
intentional design of the program to not be actuarially sound, and
a return to solvency will take a combination of committed FEMA
leadership and congressional action.46
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4015(c)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
These “pre-FIRM” structures would move to a full actuarial rate for flood
insurance if they were substantially improved at any time after the community
adopted FIRM maps, accounting for approximately seventeen percent of all
NFIP policies. BROWN, supra note 4 at 14. In addition, FEMA allows
“grandfathered” properties to maintain their flood insurance class rates even
if their property is remapped into a new flood zone, but does not consider it a
subsidy even though property owners pay less than actuarial rates. NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., AFFORDABILITY OF NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM PREMIUMS: REPORT 1 43 (2015); NFIP GRANDFATHERING RULES FOR
AGENTS 1 (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1488482596393dcc52e6c120c9327dcd75f1c08e802e4/Grand fatheringForAgents_03_2016.pdf.
Sea level rise and increasing storm surge will likely result in more properties
being grandfathered, which would further increase the number of policy
holders paying less-than-actuarial rates. See 44 C.F.R. § pt. 61, app. A(1)
(2003), WL 44 CFR § pt.61, app. A(1) .
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4017(b) (Westlaw).
44. Id. § 4016(a) (Westlaw); BROWN, supra note 4, at 24.
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-317, HIGH-RISK SERIES:
PROGRESS ON MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON
OTHERS 619 (2017) [hereinafter GAO 2017].
46. See id. at 619, 625.
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In recent years, more fiscally conservative Congresses have
recognized the need to move the NFIP to actuarial-based rates. To
that end, the Biggert-Waters Act was passed in 2012.47 Among
other items, the Biggert-Waters Act required that FEMA move the
highest-risk policies to actuarial rates in a phased approach, phase
out grandfathered policy rates, prohibit subsidized rates on
properties purchased after the enactment of the Act, and improve
flood risk mapping.48 Biggert-Waters also required FEMA to form
a Technical Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC) that, among other
mandates, was required to develop recommendations on how to
ensure that FEMA uses the best available science when considering
the impact of sea level rise.49 TMAC released its report in
December 2015, and outlined how FEMA should incorporate future
conditions as a result of sea level rise into the FIS process, including
collaborations with other federal agencies and local communities.50
The report was submitted to the FEMA Administrator in July 2016
for his consideration, but there is no requirement that FEMA
actually adopts the recommendations or includes sea level rise
projections in future FISs and FIRMs.51
Following the enactment of the Biggert-Waters Act, there was
an immediate and vocal outcry from the public as to what actuarial
rates would mean for individual pocketbooks, and Congress
responded with the Grimm-Waters Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA).52 The HFIAA repealed many
portions of Biggert-Waters, returned grandfathered policies to the
NFIP, and greatly slowed the move toward actuarial rates.53

47. Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–4131).
48. See id. §§ 4012, 4014–4015, 4101a(c) (Westlaw); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-59, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
CONTINUED PROGRESS NEEDED TO FULLY ADDRESS PRIOR GAO
RECOMMENDATIONS ON RATE-SETTING METHODS 6–7 (2016) [hereinafter GAO
2016].
49. See § 4101a. HFIAA did not repeal the TMAC provisions of BiggertWaters. See GAO 2016, supra note 48, at 7.
50. See TMAC REPORT, supra note 16, at 1–27.
51. Technical Mapping Advisory Council: TMAC Reports and
Recommendations, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/technical-mapping-advisorycouncil (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
52. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (2014) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–4131).
53. See GAO 2016, supra note 48, at 7.
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C. FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps for Rhode Island
In 2012, FEMA developed new FIRMs for Rhode Island. These
maps, developed with community input, must be adopted by
communities for its properties to qualify for NFIP-provided flood
insurance.54 Recognizing that errors can persist in FIRMs, FEMA
allows individuals and communities to petition for maps to be
amended.55 For example, individuals may claim that they are not
required to purchase flood insurance by requesting a Letter of Map
Amendment (LOMA) stating that the FIRM did not account for the
natural elevation of a property and, when properly taken into
consideration, that the property is not in an SFHA.56 Communities
may request a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) stating that the
community has implemented a physical development that resulted
in reduced flood risk to areas previously mapped in the floodplain.57
For both LOMAs and LOMRs, the request to correct a map and
FEMA’s subsequent decision to do so must be based on scientific
information that invalidates the current map; furthermore, in most
cases, the cost to request a map change and correct the map is borne
by the individual or the community.58
After the 2012 FIRMs were published, Rhode Island experts
and regulators noticed inaccuracies: the maps miscategorized risk
throughout Narragansett Bay by failing to properly account for
natural elevation on individual properties or recent flood-reduction
projects implemented by communities.59 Rhode Island believes the

54. See BROWN, supra note 4, at 4. After FEMA develops preliminary
FIRMs, they present the maps to local officials at Consultation Coordinator
Officer (CCO) meetings and to the general public at Open Houses. The Risk
MAP Flood Risk Project Lifestyle: Preliminary FIRM Issuance, FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/risk-map-flood-risk-project-lifecycle (last visited Mar.
30, 2017). At these meetings, FEMA explains the maps and any changes in
flood risk categorization, if applicable. Id. Local officials and the general public
can provide feedback at this time, but there is no obligation to address the
individual concerns. See id. After a public notification process, there is a
ninety-day comment period for anyone to challenge that the maps are
scientifically or technically incorrect, submitting data supporting their stance
that will inform revision. Id.
55. BROWN, supra note 4, at 5.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Telephone Interview with Teresa Crean, Coastal Research Assoc.,
Community Planning and Coastal Resilience (Aug. 11, 2016) [hereinafter
Crean Telephone Interview].
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FIRMs overestimate flood risk in the Upper Bay and underestimate
flood risk along the South Shore and in South County in light of
detailed sea level rise projections.60
There is no mechanism within the NFIA for a state to challenge
the full suite of FIRMs, but FEMA, responding to Rhode Island’s
concerns, stated that FIRMs are not scientifically or technically
inaccurate since the maps must only be based on historical data.61
Therefore, FIRMs cannot be appealed for failing to account for
climate change.62 Rhode Island looked for formal ways to challenge
the FIRMs outside of the NFIA, and filed a request for
determination of consistency under the Coastal Zone Management
Act in August and October of 2012.63 To date, the requests have
gone unanswered.
D. FEMA Consideration of Sea Level Rise
In December 2015, the FEMA TMAC recognized the need to
include future conditions risk assessment and modeling in their
floodplain mapping, shifting away from the current method of
analyzing flood risk as a snapshot in time.64 As part of this
assessment, TMAC recommended providing policy options and
information to coastal communities that would include the future
effects of long-term erosion and sea level rise.65 However, FEMA
stopped short of requiring communities to adopt FIRMs
incorporating sea level rise projections based on the best science
available, stating instead that “it is necessary to examine a range
of scenarios that reflect . . . plausible future states . . . .
60.
61.

Id.
Id.; Patrick Anderson, CRMC: Federal Flood Maps Flawed,
PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://pbn.com/CRMC-Federal-floodmaps-flawed,93644?print=1.
62. See Crean Telephone Interview, supra note 59; Anderson, supra note
61.
63. Anderson, supra note 61. Generally, federal consistency requires that
federal actions, within and outside the coastal zone, which have reasonably
foreseeable effects [on the coastal zone] be consistent with the enforceable
policies of a state’s federally-approved coastal management program. Federal
actions include federal agency activities, federal license or permit activities,
and federal financial assistance activities. Federal Consistency, NAT’L OCEANIC
&
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.:
OFFICE
FOR
COASTAL
MGMT.,
https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/consistency/ (last updated Nov. 21, 2016).
64. See TMAC REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. The TMAC assessment was
conducted per the Biggert-Waters Act. Id. at 2.
65. See id. at 10–15.
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Communities should be consulted to determine which scenarios and
time horizons to map . . . .”66 TMAC also recommended supporting
demonstration projects to develop future conditions data,
evaluating the costs and benefits of different flood risk mapping
projections, and serving as informational examples to other
communities across the United States.67
In October 2016, FEMA announced that it would work with
New York City to revise its flood maps following the Mayor de
Blasio administration’s appeal of the 2015 preliminary FIRMs,
which placed 35,000 more homes and buildings in the city into the
highest flood risk areas.68 As part of the agreement, FEMA will
produce new preliminary FIRMs that account for climate change
projections, including sea level rise and storm surge as guided by
the New York City Panel on Climate Change.69 While New York
City has initiated a collaboration with FEMA to consider sea level
rise in FIRMs, the path is less clear for the State of Rhode Island.
III. ANALYSIS

First, this Section describes current prohibitions on federal
government liability for flood-related damage and provides a
potential argument for government liability should that prohibition
change. It then suggests an approach for Rhode Island to directly
challenge inaccurate FIRMs to establish government liability even
though there is an explicit mechanism for states to do so. This
Comment then transitions to the potential liability that Rhode
Island face for continuing to issue building permits in areas it

66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 22–23.
68. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Mayor de Blasio and
FEMA Announce Plan to Revise NYC’s Flood Maps (Oct. 17, 2016) [hereinafter
Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, NYC Flood Map Revision],
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2016/10/17/mayor-de-blasio-and-femaannounce-plan-revise-nycs-flood-maps. Following Superstorm Sandy, FEMA
reevaluated and issued new preliminary FIRMs that increased the number of
properties required to purchase flood insurance under the NFIP by enlarging
the SFHAs. See Evan Lehmann, New York City, a Climate Change Leader,
Challenges Enlarged Flood Maps, E&E NEWS (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060024322. This led to New York challenging
the preliminary FIRMs; as a community, New York City is better positioned to
challenge FEMA preliminary FIRMs than the State of Rhode Island. See id.
(noting New York City’s “infinitely valuable” real estate).
69. See Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, NYC Flood Map
Revision, supra note 68.
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knows to be in SFHA if FIRMs were based on sea level rise
projections, and concludes by addressing the ever-present state
concern of its action being deemed a government taking.
A. Federal Government Liability
Government actions are shielded from liability claims due to
sovereign immunity and the discretionary function, as well as acts
of God. However, sea level rise may be eroding these protections as
scientific sea level rise projections become more sophisticated and
accurate. Sea level rise is more accurately described as a
projectable environmental change than an act of God, and it is
becoming less reasonable to disregard. In absence of these broad
protections, FEMA may be susceptible to a negligence claim that
FIRMs failed to incorporate sea level rise projects.70
1.

Liability for Flood Damage Statutorily Prohibited

Federal statutory law categorically states, “[n]o liability of any
kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage
from or by floods or flood waters at any place . . . .”71 However,
“decisions which impose liability on the United States for damages
from flooding [involve] . . . government conduct ‘wholly unrelated to
any [A]ct of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for
flood control, or any act [under]taken pursuant to [any] such
authorization.’”72 This has been interpreted as limiting liability for
damages from flooding and constitutes “negligence of the United
States unconnected with any congressionally-mandated flood
control initiative.”73 Thus, FEMA is not liable for damages from
inaccurate FIRMs, since FIRMs are an integral part of a
congressionally-mandated flood control initiative.74
70. See, e.g., Jennifer Klein, Potential Liability of Governments for Failure
to Prepare for Climate Change, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE L., Aug. 2015, at 1, 6–14, http://wordpress. ei.columbia.edu/climatechange-law/files/2016/06/Klein-2015-08-Liability-US-Gov-Failure-to-PrepClimate-Change.pdf (describing elements of a negligence claim needed to hold
government liable for refusing to prepare for climate change).
71. 33 U.S.C.A. § 702c (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
72. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1191 (5th Cir.
1975) (quoting Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1966)).
73. Britt v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (M.D. Ala. 1981).
74. See id.; see also Kmart Corp. v. Kroger Co., 963 F. Supp. 2d 605, 622–
23 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (city was immune from suit after operating ten-acre
landfill for dirt in floodplain adjacent to Kmart store because decision involved
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2.

Exhibiting Due Care Requires Consideration of Sea Level Rise

Even if there were no statutory prohibition on liability for
damages from flooding, or if FIRMs were deemed an exception to
this prohibition, sovereign immunity provides a second barrier of
protection for federal government actions; however, under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),75 sovereign immunity can be
waived.76 One of the broadest exceptions to the FTCA that
continues to shield government actions from tort claims is the
discretionary immunity function, which states that the FTCA shall
not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.77
Commentators have argued that the primary counter to an
FTCA argument for discretionary immunity function is that FEMA
did not exercise due care when issuing FIRMs based solely on
historical data and not incorporating sea level rise projections.78
For this claim to be successful, the risk of flooding must be so
foreseeable as to establish that FEMA owed a duty to the property
owner, and that FEMA breached that duty by not including sea
level rise projections where a reasonable agency in FEMA’s position

social, economic, or political policy).
75. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 1134).
76. Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1443 (2013) (quoting
Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2013)) (“The FTCA ‘was
designated primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States
from suits in tort.’”).
77. § 2680(a) (Westlaw) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., James Wilkins, Is Sea Level Rise “Foreseeable”? Does it
Matter?, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 437, 486–87, 495–96 (2011); see also JON
KUSLER, FLOOD RISK IN THE COURTS: REDUCING GOVERNMENT LIABILITY WHILE
ENCOURAGING GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY v (Sam Riley Medlock ed., 2011)
(noting how 100-year flood’s failure to consider future conditions and high-risk
factors such as high velocity water and erosion contribute to increase in
successful common law suits against government).
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would have done so to protect against the risk.79
This Comment contends that sea level rise is foreseeable and
related coastal flooding is a hazard that the federal government
owes a duty to protect against in the limited context of NFIPprovided flood insurance by incorporating scientifically-sound sea
level rise projects in its FIRMs.80 In recent decades, climate change
projections have sufficiently improved to accurately project sea
level rise, and each model produces a suite of potential sea level rise
scenarios ranging from more likely to occur to least likely to occur.
As climate researchers have observed actual sea level rise and
compared it to model projections, they see not only that the
projections are reasonably accurate, but often observe more sea
level rise than anticipated.81
To determine whether FEMA breached its duty by not
including sea level rise projections in FIRMs and is thereby liable
for subsequent damages, consideration of whether FEMA knew or
should have known the extent of projected sea level rise in that area
and the cost-benefit of taking action should be included.82 In Rhode
Island, it would be nearly impossible for FEMA to claim it did not
know and should not have known about the risks that sea level rise
poses for coastal properties. This is largely due to Rhode Island’s
extensive efforts to map sea level rise through STORMTOOLS.83
STORMTOOLS is an online, interactive mapping tool that allows
the user to look at coastal storms of various strengths in
combination with two, three, and five feet of sea level rise, allowing
visualization of the extent of flooding under different scenarios to
the entire Rhode Island coastline down to individual properties.84
FEMA is aware of this extensive effort, of the diverging risk
79. See Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local
Government Liability for Failure to Adapt to Climate Change, 20 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 775, 785–87 (2013) (applying duty and reasonable care analysis against
local governments for failing to adequately recognize climate change).
80. See id. at 786.
81. See Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared
to Projections, 316 SCI. 709, 709 (2007), http://science.sciencemag.
org/content/316/5825/709.
82. See Burkett, supra note 79, at 786–87.
83. STORMTOOLS, supra note 18.
84. STORMTOOLS, supra note 18; Alex Kuffner, With online tool, you can
see where R.I. would flood, PROVIDENCE J. (Jan. 1, 2015),
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/environment/20150101-uniqueonline-tool-shows-potential-for-catastrophic-flooding-in-rhode-islandinteractive.ece.
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assessment between STORMTOOLS and the 2012 FIRMs, and of
Rhode Island’s goal that future FIRMs will be informed by this
model.85 Given the level of dialogue between the state and federal
agencies, it would be unlikely that a court would find that FEMA
was not aware of the impact of sea level rise on Rhode Island coasts.
B. Special Standing for Rhode Island to Challenge FIRMs
Should the statutory provision prohibiting federal liability for
damages caused by flooding fall by the wayside and Rhode Island
decide to challenge the agency decision to not include sea level rise
projections in FIRMs, then a subsequent obstacle could be Rhode
Island establishing standing.86 Because sea level rise is occurring
at a relatively slow rate with noticeable changes only becoming
apparent decades in the future, Rhode Island could face obstacles
when showing that it suffered a concrete and particularized injury
that is either actual or imminent.87 However, in the landmark
decision Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that Massachusetts had standing to challenge an EPA
decision not to regulate carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas,
providing potential guidance for a Rhode Island challenge to
FIRMs.88 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that climate
change is a concrete injury that is already injuring the local,
national, and global environments.89 Furthermore, Massachusetts
had a particularized injury as the landowner of a “substantial
portion of the state’s coastal property” and that injury did not have
to cease completely due to EPA action, but that the slowing of the
injury was enough.90
Here, the connection between FEMA not considering sea level
rise projections when developing and implementing FIRMs is not
as straight forward an injury as loss of land due to sea level rise
found in Massachusetts v. EPA.91 Nonetheless, this does not mean
85. Crean Telephone Interview, supra note 59.
86. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)
(holding that plaintiff must show that it suffered a concrete and particularized
injury that is either actual or imminent, the injury is reasonably related to the
defendant, and the injury is likely to be redressed by a decision favorable to
plaintiff).
87. Id.
88. 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007).
89. Id. at 517, 521–22.
90. Id. at 522, 525–26.
91. Id. at 522–23.
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that there is not an injury. Rather, by not including sea level rise
projections, mandating that communities implement FIRMs could
result in municipalities and state permitting agencies making
decisions with regard to coastal development that result in
increased uninsured losses, and subsequent negative implications
for the state economy.92 Rhode Island, as the only entity that has
the authority to issue permits, could be in a unique position with
regard to standing, similar to Massachusetts as a substantial
landowner in the state.93 Unlike in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
injury here is more clearly redressed by FEMA action because it
would eliminate the misalignment between FIRMs and scientific
information known to Rhode Island, as well as better guide permit
decisions, which would reduce future injury.94
C. State and Local Government Liability
In addition to Rhode Island seeking legal avenues to challenge
FEMA regarding FIRMs, the state also could be exposed to liability
for permitting construction in SHFAs when it openly contends that
the FIRMs are inaccurate. The FTCA only applies to actions taken
by the federal government and does not apply to actions taken by
the State of Rhode Island, or any of its municipalities.95 Many
states have enacted legislation to protect state government actions
from liability in a manner similar to the exclusions to the FTCA;
however, Rhode Island is not such a state. In contrast, Rhode
Island explicitly waives sovereign immunity for the state and all
political subdivisions, making itself liable in tort actions in the
same manner as a private individual or corporation.96 While on its
92. Note that this is an example that has not yet been raised within the
courts and is provided as a purely hypothetical illustration as to how an
argument may form.
93. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522–23; but see Pennsylvania
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 21–22 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that
the right of a state to sue encompasses suits either brought to protect its
proprietary interest or brought to protect “quasi-sovereign” interests, such as
the general economy of the state. Furthermore, for such a claim the state must
show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek remedies for injury to
private parties, who could themselves have prosecuted their own particular
claims).
94. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521–23.
95. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671–2680 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327); see
Amy M. Hackman, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act: How Much is Enough?, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 411–12 (1997).
96. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.)
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face this seems to be a liberal policy that opens the state and local
governments to a broad range of tort actions, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has not applied such a broad interpretation, but
instead has interpreted it in combination with the public duty
doctrine to continue to bar many actions against the State.97
Over the last several decades, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has applied three significant exceptions to the public duty doctrine,
once again opening state and local governments to tort lawsuits:98
(1) when the duty arose from an activity “that a private person or
corporation would be likely to carry out,”99 (2) “when the state has
knowledge that it has created a circumstance that forces an
individual into a position of peril and subsequently chooses not to
remedy the situation,”100 and (3) when a plaintiff is owed a duty in
his individual capacity.101
A lawsuit against the State of Rhode Island for permitting
certain activities in an area that is not listed on FEMA’s FIRM as
a SFHA, but Rhode Island has knowledge is subject to flooding due
to sea level rise that would otherwise qualify it as an SFHA, may
be allowed under the egregious conduct by the state exception.
State courts have not answered this question, but it would be
analyzed according to the three-part test described in Haley:
“(1) Did the state create circumstances that forced a
reasonably prudent person into a position of extreme peril?
(2) Did the state have actual or constructive knowledge of
the perilous circumstances?
(3) Did the state having been afforded a reasonable amount
of time to eliminate the dangerous condition, fail to do
so?”102

(there is a $100,000 cap on recovery under § 9-31-2).
97. See Ryan v. R.I. Dep’t. of Transp., 420 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1980);
Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350, 356–57 (R.I. 1978).
98. See generally Roger Nathaniel LeBoeuf, The Public Duty Doctrine and
the Rhode Island Tort Claims Act, 43 R.I. B. J. 11 (1995).
99. See Delong v. Prudential Prop. & Cas., 583 A.2d 75, 76 (R.I. 1990);
O’Brien v. State, 555 A.2d 334, 338 (R.I. 1989); Catone v. Medberry, 555 A.2d
328, 333 (R.I. 1989).
100. See Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992) (quoting
Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 67 (R.I. 1991)); Bierman v. Shookster, 590 A.2d
402, 404 (R.I. 1991) (quoting Verity, 585 A.2d at 67).
101. See Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656, 658–59 (R.I. 1990).
102. LeBoeuf, supra note 98, at 16 (citing Haley, 611 A.2d at 489).
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Under this framework, a state permit for an activity in an area
that is not included in a FIRM’s SFHA but would have been if
FEMA considered sea level rise as suggested by Rhode Island could
be subject to liability if flood damage occurs without the option for
the property owner to purchase flood insurance through the
NFIP.103 By permitting the action, the reasonably prudent person
who sought out a permit is now in a position of peril, the state has
actual knowledge of the perilous circumstances, and the state could
have eliminated the dangerous condition by not issuing the permit;
however, Florida courts have considered a similar argument where
a city furnished incorrect FIRMs, resulting in a house that was
later declared ineligible for the NFIP.104 There, the court held that
a waiver of sovereign immunity did apply, but that the public duty
doctrine precluded the city from liability because the city did not
owe a special duty to the individuals who applied for the building
permit for their home.105 However, one commentator has noted
that the discretionary decision of the city was whether or not to
participate in the NFIP; but once that decision was made,
complying with the NFIP requirements was mandatory as there are
substantial penalties for non-enforcement, including not being able
to continue participation in the primary flood insurance option
available to individuals.106
D. Federal Consistency Requirement of the Coastal Zone
Management Act
Even if Rhode Island is not able to directly challenge the
methodology FEMA uses to develop FIRMs, it has a powerful legal
tool in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA): federal
consistency.107 Under federal consistency requirements, federal
agencies issuing federal permits and licenses that are reasonably
likely to affect any land or water use, or natural resources of the
coastal zone are required to do so in a manner consistent, to the
maximum extent practicable, with the state’s coastal management
program developed and implemented under the CZMA.108
103. C.f. Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158, 1170 (R.I. 2001).
104. See e.g., City of Tarpon Springs v. Garrigan, 510 So. 2d 1198, 1199–
1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
105. Id. at 1199.
106. See Wilkins, supra note 78, at 458.
107. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451–1464 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
108. Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Westlaw); R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL,
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Rhode Island is a CZMA state; the CRMC implements the
state’s coastal management program, which is colloquially known
as the Red Book.109 The Red Book extensively highlights planning
for sea level rise as a state priority; and the CRMC has statutory
authority “to develop and adopt policies and regulations necessary
to manage the coastal resources of the state and protect life and
property from coastal hazards resulting from projected sea level
rise and probable increased frequency and intensity of coastal
storms due to climate change.”110 Furthermore, a stated CRMC
policy is to “review its policies, plans and regulations to proactively
plan for and adapt to climate change and sea level rise,” and to
“integrate climate change and sea level rise scenarios into its
programs to prepare Rhode Island for these new, evolving
conditions and make our coastal areas more resilient.”111 CRMC’s
Federal Consistency Manual includes a list of activities that are
subject to the federal consistency requirement, including,
“[r]evisions to Flood Insurance Study and National Flood Insurance
maps.”112
CRMC, through its executive director, expressed in writing to
FEMA a request for determination of federal consistency of the
2012 FIRMs with the CRMC Red Book.113 FEMA’s response will
dictate the next steps taken by Rhode Island’s CRMC.
E. Takings
Assuming that Rhode Island is able to successfully challenge
FEMA’s decision to not include sea level rise projections in FIRMs,
or FEMA voluntarily adopts the TMAC recommendations and
incorporates sea level rise—neither of which are on the immediate
horizon—then Rhode Island and the federal government could face
yet another legal hurdle from property owners: violations of the

COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM § 400, pp. 1–2 (2012),
http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives/regdocs/released/pdf/CRMC/7823.pdf
[hereinafter The Red Book].
109. 46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(1)(v)(B) (Westlaw through 2016 Legis.
Sess.); The Red Book, supra note 108, at § 145, p. 5.
110. § 46-23-6(2) (Westlaw).
111. The Red Book, supra note 108, at § 145, p. 6.
112. Id. § 400, p. 1; R.I. COASTAL RES. MGMT. COUNCIL, FEDERAL
CONSISTENCY MANUAL: DIRECT FEDERAL ACTIVITIES 27, http://sos.ri.gov/
documents/archives/regdocs/released/pdf/CRMC/CRMC _1059_.pdf.
113. Crean Telephone Interview, supra note 59; Anderson, supra note 61.
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Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment.114 The Takings
Clause states that the government may not take private property
for public use without just compensation.115 Some have suggested
that the elimination of flood insurance subsidies under the NFIP
could be a regulatory taking should it result in reduced property
value;116 however, courts have been hesitant to award
compensation to private property owners based on the expectation
that a subsidy continue.117
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has authority over
complicated and often contentious agreements between private
landowners and the federal government as to water allocation
rights and water purchase prices, has held that the government’s
changes to pricing provisions, which reduced the level of subsidy at
the time of contract renewal, are permissible even when the policy
shift was drastic and likely caused business disruptions that were
based on an expectation that the subsidy would continue.118
Furthermore, the expectation that a subsidy will continue

114.
115.
116.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
Sean B. Hecht, Insurance, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 511, 518 (Michael B. Gerrard &
Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012) (“[A] government requirement for risk-based
pricing might conceivably also open up the possibility of takings claims against
the government if the requirement were to deprive the land of all economic
value to the owner, even though such a requirement would be aimed at
restoring the functioning of the insurance market.”); John D. Echeverria,
Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 187 (2005)
(noting that the court did, however, highlight several important factors for
assessing an alleged regulatory taking: 1) the “economic impact of the
government action;” 2) “the extent to which the regulation ‘interferes with
distinct investment-backed expectations;’” and 3) “the ‘character’ of the action.”
Additionally, a “taking” may be found “when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government” or, “when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”); see also Benjamin
Houston & Noah D. Hall, Managing Demand for Water, in THE LAW OF
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 95, 98,
109–11 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh, eds., 2012) (mentioning
increased flooding as one of the attendant problems with water in western
states connected with global climate change).
117. See Sarah Fox, This is Adaptation: The Elimination of Subsidies
Under the National Flood Insurance Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 238
(2014).
118. See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.
1993).
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indefinitely is not a protected property interest.119 Therefore, the
elimination of flood insurance subsidies through the NFIP that
result in a decrease in private property value would not likely be a
regulatory taking.120
The courts could find that there was a government regulatory
taking should the reduction or elimination of flood insurance
subsidies result in a total diminution of property value.121 As
regulations that result in total diminution in value are considered
per se takings, no balancing of the factors considered in the Penn
Central analysis is necessary.122 This is not an unfathomable
result of drastic changes to the NFIP’s FIRM development process.
Homeowners could argue that implementation of actuarial-based
rates resulted in not being able to pay flood insurance premiums,
which led to subsequent cancellation of their flood insurance
policies. Without flood insurance, the homeowners would fail to
meet the requirements of their federally-backed mortgage, and
thus, would be forced to sell their homes. This in itself may not be
enough to constitute a taking, but if the actuarial-based flood
insurance essentially drives all potential buyers from the market,
then the homeowners could argue that their property has no
market value; however, the analysis does not end there. The
homeowner would have to go one step further than merely
presenting evidence that the market value of the home is
completely diminished; the homeowner would have to show that the
property has no economic value of any kind for a regulatory taking
to have occurred, a showing of which only a few homeowners have
been successful.123 In addition to a high bar to show a complete
diminution of all economic value, the state and federal government
have no obligation to subsidize flood insurance, so an elimination of
the subsidy is unlikely to constitute a taking.124
Despite the low likelihood of a court determining that the
elimination or reduction of flood insurance subsidies would be a
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, governments at all
119. See United States v. 42.13 Acres of Land, 73 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir.
1996).
120. See Fox, supra note 117, at 239.
121. Id.
122. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–32 (1992); see
also Fox, supra note 117, at 239.
123. See Richard J. Lazarus, Lucas Unspun, 16 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 13, 28
(2007).
124. See Fox, supra note 117, at 240–41.
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levels, particularly state and local governments, are overly cautious
when implementing regulatory changes that may raise the specter
of takings.125
IV. CONCLUSION

Realistically, there are limited legal avenues for the State of
Rhode Island to pursue in order to challenge the full suite of FIRMs
for state coastal areas that do not incorporate sea level rise
projections; there are also limitations on Rhode Island’s liability for
complying with the FIRMs even when Rhode Island has scientific
information that the FIRMS are not accurate. Challenges at both
the federal and state levels are prevented by statutory prohibitions
on government liability for damages caused by flooding, sovereign
immunity, and public policy doctrine, in addition to an aversion to
running crosswise with the takings doctrine. There may be a path
forward through requiring FIRMs that are consistent with state
regulations under the federal consistency clause of the CZMA,
which expressly states that preparation for and adaptation to sea
level rise is a priority in Rhode Island. There are recent indications
from FEMA that it plans to more seriously consider incorporating
sea level rise projections into FIRMs, and it recently agreed to work
with New York City to do so following Superstorm Sandy.126
Rhode Island has compiled and assessed vast data to develop
STORMTOOLS to interactively illustrate the impact of sea level
rise down to the individual parcel level along the state’s coasts.
Rhode Island is cutting-edge in regards to embracing climate
change projections, particularly sea level rise, due to the relatively
large impact on the small state; but there are indications that other
states are catching up in their planning strategies. If sea level rise
continues to impact coastal communities and strong coastal storms
continue to cause substantial damage, Rhode Island is well situated
to be the first state to work with FEMA to develop comprehensive
FIRMs that incorporate sea level rise.

125. Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41
ECOLOGY L. Q. 131, 133 n.6 (2014).
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Appeal, LAW360 (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/852873/
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